ABSTRACT Innovation diffusion is the process of adopting novel things, which is deemed as the diffusion of human behaviors. Previous studies mainly posit an unclear distinction with information diffusion. However, there exist critical differences in both social and economic areas. Inspired by this observation, we propose a practical method for innovation diffusion based on the process of behavior diffusion, which integrates threshold model with social imitation strategy. The primary goal of our proposed model is to combine individuals' economic as well as social characteristics to study innovation diffusion. The interplay of these two strategies is studied in the context of a coordination game. According to the simulation results on Erdös-Rényi random networks and small-world networks, we find that the conjunction of these two approaches can greatly improve the efficiency of innovation diffusion. In addition, we further study the impacts of varied initial seeds' selection strategies on the overall performance of innovation diffusion using our proposed model.
I. INTRODUCTION
Throughout the years it has been evident that the evolution of human society often involves the emergence of new technologies, norms and etc. The corresponding appropriate application of which can make tasks significantly more convenient and provide us a plethora of personal and social benefits. The manner by which the implementation of such innovations perpetuates through the society has become increasingly interesting [1] . This phenomenon has captured the attention of many researchers emanating from quite diverse backgrounds. In this paper, we simulate the process of innovation diffusion as behavior diffusion on different network structures, and explore an effective hybrid method to maximize its effectiveness.
Innovation diffusion focuses on the issue of how innovations diffuse through the society based on individuals' adoption strategies when facing new things. It is the process of behavior diffusion, while most of previous works confused it with information diffusion. The distinction between behavior diffusion and information diffusion is not clear and often leads to confusion. The studies in [2] and [3] belong to the field of social contagion, and the issue of dispersion has been studied. However, qualitative differences still exist between them. The major distinctions can be illustrated from both social and economic areas.
In order to prove that innovation diffusion is different with information diffusion, Centola [4] designed an online experiment and the results indicated that under different network topologies, innovation diffusion is similar with behavior diffusion, which requires multiple contacts while a single contact is sufficient for information diffusion. Therefore, it is inappropriate to study innovation diffusion in the same manner as information diffusion, and is essential to propose a method of innovation diffusion based on the process of behavior diffusion.
In economics area, innovation diffusion [5] can be regarded as the process of adopting new policies, products or technologies, which may result in individual losses or benefits [6] . In other words, an individual's choice of whether adopting innovations has direct effects on his own profits. From the perspective of economists, people are often more cautious and rational to make decisions when related to their own interests instead of making their choices arbitrarily. While in information diffusion [7] , there is no need for individuals to take corresponding actions to express their opinions and cannot influence their own benefits.
Currently, the main methods used to study the diffusion of innovation are from social and economic areas. From the perspective of sociologists, people are not always driven by material benefits but also consider the suggestions of others when making choices. We attempt to seek advice from our friends, relatives or colleagues rather than strangers before we make decisions. Granovetter proposed a threshold model to study the diffusion of human behavior [8] , which used the number of people to calculate the threshold value. Watts et al. implemented a different method to present threshold value [9] , by which the threshold value can be presented to eliminate the personal influence and provide flexibility for application in different network topologies. Peer-pressure is also considered to study innovation diffusion [10] . The mechanisms of peer-pressure and threshold model are very similar because they both reveal a psychological condition that individuals tend to conform to the vast majority. In addition, there are models which consider geographic, media factors [11] or social influences [12] , [13] to study innovation diffusion.
From the perspective of economists, several proposals have been advocated to study the process of innovation diffusion using game theory [14] . A typical solution to study this problem is called the best-response method [15] , where the agent itself compares the benefits that he or she will receive by adopting the new behavior with maintaining the original one. Individuals will certainly select the behavior with the higher payoff. Due to the inherent irrational human tendencies at times, Montanari and Saberi [16] proposed the bestresponse model by considering noise. The results indicate that the degree of network connectivity affects diffusion, thereby affirming the conclusion of Centola [4] which proves that behavior diffusion is different from opinion contagion. Young [17] proposed a parallel way to study innovation diffusion called the best-response learning process, which includes the probability of irrationality and human error. In addition, social imitation is also an effective mechanism to study innovation diffusion [18] . Individuals observe their neighbors' payoffs, and imitate the highest payoff's strategy [19] .
Social imitation and best-response strategy are the most frequently used methods to study innovation diffusion in the economic area. We are therefore posed with the question which one has greater accuracy when modeling the reality. The best-response method assumes that people are highly rational and have the ability to evaluate the performance of each choice [20] . It involves an agent making rational comparisons as to the respective benefits awarded by maintaining its original behavior or adopting a new one, and makes an informed decision based on the highest payoff. However, the best-response method overestimates the rationality of individuals. In reality, time, energy and resources often limit the accuracy of payoff estimation. As a consequence, unconsciously or otherwise, individuals commonly tend to simply imitate the actions of others [21] .
The social and economic solutions outlined above have their respective limitations. Inspired by this view, it is necessary to investigate whether these methods encompassing people's behavior of being emotional and rational irregularly can coact with each other and surpass the limitations of each method. In order to depict the process of innovation diffusion more precisely, the threshold and social imitation model are nominated in the proposed model to reflect the emotional and rational characteristics of human beings. The social imitation method is preferred over the best-response method, mainly because of two reasons. Firstly, social imitation model is more appropriate for the diffusion process as we mentioned above. Secondly, the mechanisms of best-response and threshold theory are assumed the same to some extent. Both possess a critical state for the whole population to accept innovations, which can be calculated according to [22] and [23] . As a result, we propose our hybrid mechanism model which combines economic and social factors, and utilizes game theory to explore their mutual interplay.
Upon the model we propose to promote the innovation diffusion, how to select the initial seeds in order to trigger global cascades still poses many questions [25] , [26] . In the initial phase of innovation diffusion, nodes must be selected to activate the diffusion process. It is obvious that with a large enough population, it is almost impossible to trigger global cascades with single initial seed [27] . Current works have mainly utilized K-shell or degree based algorithms to select the initial seeds to trigger global cascades [28] . However, such selection strategies have been merely evaluated under models that are based on single mechanism, such as pure threshold model [29] . As a consequence, it is necessary to discover a more efficient way of selecting seeds by the proposed hybrid model.
Three heuristic methods are used to study this question and their performances are compared using our model. The major contributions of this work are the integration of threshold and social imitation mechanisms to distinguish innovation diffusion from information diffusion. Besides, different initial seeds' selection strategies are implemented and evaluated on our hybrid model. All methods are simulated on Erdös-Rényi random networks (ER random networks) [30] and smallworld networks [31] . The results suggest that the proposed model can greatly promote the innovation diffusion. We then find that among the three heuristic initial seeds' selection strategies applied on the proposed model, the degree-centered method achieves the best performance.
II. METHOD
The coordination game is the most frequently used game theory setup when studying innovation diffusion [14] . The main idea is the more people making the same choice as others, the more benefits will be received. However, if different choices are made from their counterparts, the received benefits would be very little.
In order to simplify our model which is a binary choice problem, a coordination game is implemented. Agents will VOLUME 4, 2016 get the highest payoff if a similar action to their counterparts is taken, otherwise, they receive no payoff. According to the coordination game theory, the optimal condition is for the entire population to take the same action which indicates all the individuals shall receive the highest payoff. Individuals play the coordination game with their neighbors and then receive payoff values according to the payoff matrix as listed in Table 1 . In reality, individuals' threshold values to adopt a new behavior may be different. Individuals with creative minds may easily accept innovations, while stubborn individuals may require a greater threshold to be convinced. Nonetheless, this paper focuses on the performance of the hybrid mechanism. Thus for simplification, it is assumed that all the agents in the social network have identical threshold values. For illustrative purposes, behavior A is used to represent the original state and behavior B represents the new innovative behavior.
A graph is used to represent the social network such that each node indicates an agent. Each agent can only interact with his or her nearest neighbors that are directly connected with itself. Each agent plays the coordination game with its neighbors and receives their respected payoff values. Agents then update their status according to the social imitation rule or threshold method. The rule of social imitation method is after every round, agent with behavior A adopts the choice of its neighbor with the highest payoff. If such a choice is behavior B, the agent will change its behavior from A to B, otherwise, maintains its original strategy. The other rules implemented is the threshold model. Each agent is assigned an identical threshold value φ, which belongs to the interval [0, 1] . If the fraction of the agent's neighbors adopting B is larger or equal to its threshold value, then the agent will switch to B either.
Initially, all nodes possess behavior A except the chosen nodes to be the innovative ones which adopt behavior B. At each timestep, one node is randomly selected and subsequently updated in asynchronous order. Besides the above updating strategies, we add dynamics into our model. Agents select social imitation method with probability p or threshold method with a probability 1-p. Agents update their statuses accordingly. This process continues for the entire population for one iteration. In this paper, our primary focus is on innovation diffusion. As such, only a shift from behavior A to behavior B is considered, after which this work assumes B is maintained indefinitely.
Since a small number of initiators is insufficient to trigger global cascades, which is the process of the whole population adopting the innovation, three distinct heuristic methods on how to select initial seeds are implemented and the performances are compared. They are random chosen method (RCM), K-shell method (KSM) and degree-centered method (DCM). In RCM, we randomly choose nodes as initial seeds. We use the k-shell algorithm [32] to choose initial seeds in KSM. In addition, nodes with highest degrees are chosen to be initial seeds in DCM.
Simulations are performed on ER random networks and the performance of our hybrid approach is evaluated by varying the values of p, α and φ. According to Young's paper [17] , the value of α is assigned a value larger than 0. If α is smaller or equal to 0, it leads to a less effective innovative. Obviously people cannot make profits by adopting the innovation, on the contrary, it brings agents themselves costs and makes the new innovation do not have any significance. Thus it leads to the innovations cannot spread via social imitation method. The number of agents who adopt B is used to evaluate the performance of the model. It is calculated by the average over 1000 realizations, each of which includes 10,000 Monte-Carlo iterations. The size of the implemented ER random network includes 10,000 nodes.
For ER random networks, another required parameter is the average degree k of nodes. In the limit of pure threshold dynamics which is the condition that p = 0, there exists an upper bound for threshold values to achieve global cascades and the critical values are approximated to 1/k, beyond which global cascades cannot be triggered [23] . To explore the performance of our combined approach, we focus on threshold values beyond the boundary which does not trigger global cascades. Based on the coordination game setup, the pure social imitation method would reach global cascades under the circumstance that α is sufficiently large, which can be calculated based on the value of k. Hence we select the extent of α and φ where applying these two updating strategies alone, the innovation cannot diffuse through the majority.
III. SIMULATION RESULTS
The experiments are conducted on ER random networks and small-world networks according to our proposed methods. Two different initial seeds' selection strategies are evaluated in the proposed model. We first evaluate the performance of the proposed model with a small set of initiators, which are one randomly chosen node with its neighbors. Then we apply three varied methods of initiators' selection on the proposed model to explore their performances, which are DCM, KSM, and RCM.
A. SIMULATION RESULTS WITH A SMALL SET OF INITIATORS
At the initial state, when p increases from 0, the model functions as a hybrid model instead of social imitation model. As Fig. 1(a) shows, the size of individuals displays an instant increase. Then the size stays quite stable as p changes. At last, when p approaches to 1, the size falls to near the initial state. When p = 0 and p = 1, the model represents a threshold or social imitation model. The innovation cannot diffuse solely through pure social imitation method, but is achieved through the added threshold strategies. With those new adopters, innovation can then spread via social imitation rules. These two different mechanisms help each other to promote innovation diffusion. When one strategy is constrained, diffusion may occur under the condition of another strategy. When the innovations diffuse to the edge, where nodes nearby it cannot be satisfied by both strategies, the contagion process stops. Thus it can be seen that the number of individuals who adopt innovations using our hybrid model is much larger than using pure threshold or social imitation model.
As Fig. 1(a) depicts, after the size increases rapidly in the beginning, we find that there exists a stable state, where the size of adopted individuals does not change very much. To explain this result, we primarily need to discuss whether the sequence of choosing updating strategies will affect the final size. When individuals choose their updating strategies, the final result of applying each strategy is whether they adopt the innovations or not according to updating rules. With our proposed parameter p, no matter which strategy individuals choose and how it works, there always exists the possibility to choose the other strategy if only we run this simulation long enough. In other words, whatever strategy individuals choose to update first, as long as individuals adopt innovations under these two updating strategies, the final result will be the same that individuals change its behavior from A to B.
The above findings lead to the quite stable state. In other words, as long as individuals will adopt the innovation under these two strategies, regardless of the changes in p, individuals have the possibility to choose the innovative strategy. When their neighbors begin to update, it will not affect the diffusion process in next round. Finally, when neither of the two strategies can make individuals adopt the innovation, the cascading process stops.
We then explore the impacts of ER random network's degrees on our model. As Fig. 1(b) shows, for networks with larger average degrees, comparing with those who have smaller degrees, under the condition that they have the same threshold value, obviously it is harder to affect nodes in networks with a larger average degree. Because they need more innovative neighbors to be convinced. While networks with quite small degrees, in the view of the whole social network, the nodes inside it are not well connected and it exists more isolated nodes compared to networks with larger degrees. Thus as the results indicate, innovation can spread through more people with appropriate values of k which are neither too large nor too small.
Another parameter we add to study its influence on innovation diffusion is α, which is the extra benefit that agents will get if they adopt the innovation. When we calculate each agent's payoff according to Table 1 , it depends on the number of their neighbors who are in the same status as themselves. The more neighbors they have in the same status as themselves, the more payoff they will get. Thus in ER random network, the value of α to trigger global cascades is relative to its average degree k. Based on the values of average degrees, we can estimate the range of α's value, beyond which the innovation can diffuse through the whole population via social imitation strategy only.
As Fig. 1(c) shows, when α is in the range of [1, 3] , the bigger α becomes, the more individuals would adopt the innovations and finally extend to large enough values to trigger global cascades. People who decide to change its behavior from A to B would benefit more by choosing social imitation method. In next round, with the newly increased nodes, the innovation can diffuse to a larger extent of φ under the same circumstances. The results show us these two mechanisms' cooperation process and promote the innovation diffusion.
Besides evaluating our hybrid model's performance via the final size of adopted population, we also explore the timesteps needed for the diffusion process to reach its final stable state under our hybrid model. As Fig. 1(d) shows, the time to steady state appears to be a U-shape as the value of p changes. When p is too large or too small that make the innovation cannot spread, it almost do not need time to achieve steady state because it cannot diffuse from the beginning. Thus the original state is their steady state and does not need time to achieve it. Then as p increases from 0, our hybrid mechanism helps diffuse the innovation through threshold and social imitation methods, which greatly reduce the time to steady state. When p = 0.5, the possibility of choosing threshold and social imitation updating strategies is equal, which greatly helps to reduce the whole timesteps needed to steady state than under other circumstances. We also run the whole above experiments on small-world networks, and the results are similar with ER random networks which are shown in Fig. 2 .
B. SIMULATION RESULTS WITH DIFFERENT SELECTION STRATEGIES OF INITIAL SEEDS
According to the results we got above, it is apparent that innovation cannot spread through the whole population with a small set of initial seeds. Hence the choice of initial seeds also plays an important role in determining the final size of the cascades. Therefore in this part, we look into this question via comparing the performances of three selecting strategies, which are DCM, KSM, and RCM.
There are two crucial factors from both economic and social area need to be considered when choosing initial seeds. The first one is whether the chosen initial seeds have the ability to influence as many individuals as it can. It needs the chosen initial seeds have high degrees. Seeds with high degrees guarantee that they have more links to other nodes, and it can reach more nodes than seeds with low degrees. Thus nodes with high degrees should be chosen as initial seeds. In addition, the chosen initial seeds should get a high payoff by adopting innovation behavior comparing with stay to the original one. When people are rational, they are only affected by economic factors which require nodes with innovation behavior should have higher payoff value than the original payoff in order to influence other nodes nearby them. When we choose initial seeds in the beginning, due to the coordination game's payoff matrix, the initial seeds can only get profits by choosing them in the same neighborhood. Therefore, it also needs to choose initial seeds in one neighborhood as near as possible to ensure their profits.
We first evaluate the performance of the three methods by comparing the number of initial seeds they need to trigger global cascades, which is presented by n i in the follow parts. As Fig. 3 shows, using DCM needs the least amount of initial seeds to trigger global cascades than the other two methods. In DCM, we choose the seeds with the highest degrees, which can reach and influence the most seeds than the other two methods, so it needs the least n i . The location of seeds with highest degrees is uncertain that they may distribute anywhere in the network, which makes using DCM reach the most seeds than the other two methods under the same circumstances. While in KSM, the chosen seeds tend to form a cluster. In other words, it leads to the situation that only nodes nearby them can be affected and nodes in other part of the network cannot be influenced. Although innovation can spread through this small neighborhood, according to the network topologies that the links between this small neighborhood and the other part of the network are not so tense, it is hard for this small group of innovators to influence nodes outside of it. Hence the performance of KSM on our model is not so good as DCM. In addition, RCM does not consider the two crucial factors that influence the process of innovation diffusion, thus it performs the worst among the three methods. The similar results also can be obtained under small-world networks as shown in Fig. 4 .
Upon the results we got above, we then compare the timesteps that these three methods need to achieve steady state. The performances of them rank the same as before which DCM still works best that needs the shortest time to steady state as shown in Fig. 5(a) and Fig. 5(b) . Based on rules of choosing seeds in DCM, it satisfies the two important factors as we analyze above. In addition, due to the uncertainty of locations of the initial seeds in DCM, the initial seeds can be anywhere in the network. Thus the diffusion procedure can start at very different positions in the network, and can therefore significantly reduce the time required to reach a steady state. In considering KSM, the chosen initial seeds have high degrees and distribute restraint in one area. The diffusion process starts in the neighborhoods with initial seeds at a single location in the same time. As such, KSM requires more diffusion time than DCM. Therefore the time to steady state using DCM is the shortest among the three methods. As we increase the number of initial seeds from 100 to 300, the time taken to reach a steady state is also obviously reduced.
In addition, the average degree values k of the network are varied to evaluate the impacts on these three methods. As shown in Fig. 5(c) and Fig. 5(d) , the size of the adopted population increases as the value of k increases. Furthermore, as the value of k increases, the size of the adopted population decreases. This occurs because innovation can only diffuse with appropriate values of k. The results indicate that VOLUME 4, 2016 DCM has the widest range of k values in which innovation can spread. In addition, as the number of initial seeds is increased, the range of k for which innovation diffusion occurs also becomes wider. We also conduct the same experiments on small-world networks, and still the results are similar as shown in Fig. 6 .
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a hybrid mechanism model by integrating the threshold and social imitation models to study the process of innovation diffusion. It differentiates the innovation diffusion process from information diffusion in both social and economic perspectives, and thereby strictly follows the process of behavior diffusion. The model incorporates both rational and emotional aspects of humans in an attempt to reflect reality with greater accuracy. We run scientific simulations on ER random networks and small-world networks. Interestingly, the results indicate that the proposed hybrid model can greatly improve the number of people who adopt the innovation, and the time required to reach an equilibrium is greatly reduced.
Under the circumstance with a huge population size, it is impossible to let the innovations diffuse to the large majority with a small number of initiators. To address this issue, three heuristic ways of selecting initial seeds are presented and their performances are evaluated based on our model. According to the coordination game theoretical setup, as shown in the results, using DCM to select initial seeds works best both on the amount of initial seeds that need to trigger global cascades as well as the time required to reach a steady state among the three methods. 
